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The debate over various definitions of sustainability has for the most part been conducted 
within the framework of traditional welfare economics. Discussion has centered on technical 
issues imbedded within the functional forms of various optimization models, especially the 
coefficient of the elasticity of substitution and the social discount rate. A more basic problem 
is that intractable theoretical difficulties within welfare economics call into question the 
results of traditional models of sustainability regarding intergenerational welfare. Another 
difficulty is that equating per capita consumption with welfare contradicts empirical evidence 
that suggests that the link between happiness and wealth/income is relatively weak. 
Alternative approaches to measuring well-being are being developed and these have great 
potential to move the sustainability debate forward.  
 
Keywords: Boadway paradox, happiness, potential Pareto improvement, utility, weak 
sustainability, welfare theory 
 
JEL Classification: D6, D91, O11, Q01  
 
The author would like to thank the following people for comments on an earlier draft: Ada 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Jeroen van den Bergh, Brendan Haley, Raluca Iorgulescu, Eric 
Neumayer, Yew-Kwang Ng, John Polimeni, and Patrik Söderholm. An earlier version of this 
paper was presented at the Fall 2003 meeting of the Canadian Society for Ecological 
Economics.   2
Toward a New Welfare Foundation for Sustainability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  The debate between advocates of weak and strong sustainability has, for the most 
part, focused on the substitutability between natural capital and human-made capital of 
various sorts (see the summary by Pezzey and Toman, 2002). A great deal of work has 
explored the conditions for optimizing intergenerational social welfare but little attention has 
been given in the sustainability literature to the intractable difficulties inherent in making 
Pareto consistent welfare comparisons. Weak sustainability is firmly rooted in the New 
Welfare Economics (NWE) that dominated economic theory from the late 1930s until the 
1990s (Bowles and Gintis, 2000; Suzumura, 1999). The emphasis of NWE is on achieving 
efficiency in allocating economic outputs and inputs through substitution and seeking 
potential Pareto improvements (PPIs). Weak sustainability is based on the work of Solow 
(1974, 1993) and Hartwick (1977, 1996) concerning the allocation through time of an 
exhaustible resource. The basic idea is that social welfare (defined as the sum of individual 
utilities) should be non-declining through time.
1 Welfare is (explicitly or implicitly) equated 
with consumption, broadly defined, so sustainability across generations is assured by 
maintaining the total stock of capital used to generate economic goods, broadly defined. In 
the weak sustainability framework, substitution is not only permitted, it can be a moral 
imperative: if the net present value generated by transforming natural capital into human-
made capital is greater than the net present value generated by leaving natural capital intact, 
then this transformation should be done (Beckerman, 1994; Solow, 1993). Otherwise the 
inefficient use of capital will mean that future generations will be needlessly worse off.
2    3
  Advocates of strong sustainability argue that traditional neoclassical models 
overestimate the possibilities of substitution between natural and manufactured capital 
including the related problems of complementarity, irreversibility, pure uncertainty, and 
discontinuous change (Daly, 1995; Gowdy, 2004; McDaniel and Gowdy, 2000; Ng and 
Wills, 2002). The debate over strong sustainability has, for the most part, also taken place 
within the framework of NWE. The question of the substitutability of manufactured for 
natural capital can be reduced to a purely empirical question within neoclassical economics 
as to the elasticity of substitution between different kinds of capital. Weak sustainability, and 
strong sustainability as it relates to capital substitutability, boils down to applying the Second 
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics and "getting the prices right." But the problems 
with NWE models of sustainability run much deeper than disagreements over which prices to 
use and the degree of substitutability between human-made and natural capital. NWE has 
foundered on the attempt to make social welfare judgments without making interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. This calls into question a central concern of economics during the last 
fifty years, that is, the identification of the most "efficient" economic policies to increase the 
output of goods and services. The theoretical difficulties with neoclassical measures of 
potential Pareto improvements, and the abandonment of NWE by leading neoclassical 
theorists, are critically important for the sustainability debate. 
  If the NWE framework cannot be used as a guide to evaluate welfare changes over 
time, what framework should take its place? Fortunately, theoretical and empirical research is 
quickly filling the void left by NWE. Economists are going back to Bentham to ask the 
question: “What makes people happy?” (Dixon, 1997; Easterlin, 2001; Frey and Stutzer, 
2002; Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997; Layard, 2003; Ng, 1997, 2003; Schwarz and   7
years of theoretical work has led inexorably to the conclusion that determining the welfare 
consequences of an economic policy change cannot be done by simply summing individual 
welfare changes (Boadway, 1974; Bromley, 1990; Chipman and Moore, 1978; Scitovsky, 
1941; Suzumura, 1999). The basic problem is that relative prices change when redistribution 
occurs so that, in effect, calculating PPIs involve comparing partial equilibrium situations 
and drawing general equilibrium conclusions (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1990; Boadway, 
1974, 938; Johansson-Stenman, 1998; Jones, 2002). 
 
FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
  Figure 2 illustrates the notion of an intergenerational PPI. Consider some policy 
change initiated at time t that will affect the welfare of those in time t+1. Examples of such 
policy changes include global warming (Nordhaus, 2001), and biodiversity loss (Weitzman, 
1992). Policies affecting the global economy invariably make some worse off and others 
better off (Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2002). The vertical and horizontal axes show the total 
utilities of two consumers At and Bt at time t and the total utilities of consumers At+1 and Bt+1 
at some future time period t+1. Assume that consumers At and At+1 have identical tastes, as 
do consumers Bt and Bt+1. Alternatively, we can assume that At and At+1, and Bt and Bt+1 are 
the same consumers with unchanging tastes but living in two different time periods. Suppose 
we wish to evaluate some sustainability policy, say investing in climate change mitigation, 
that would take effect in period t+1. Using the PPI principle, a movement from X on the 
utility possibilities frontier UPFt to X' on UPFt+1 would satisfy dW/dt > 0 since potentially 
we could move to X’’ on UPFt+1 so that At+1 > At and Bt+1  > Bt. But, if we begin at X' on   8
UPFt+1 and ask whether or not we were better off at the original point X on UPFt the answer 
is "yes" since from X' we can move to X’’’ where At > At+1  and Bt > Bt+1.
3 Intergenerational 
applications of the PPI principle also run afoul of the Boadway and Scitovsky paradoxes. 
Boadway (1974) proved that the compensating variations (CV's) for a lump sum 
redistribution of income have a positive sum. This implies that conventional measures of 
potential Pareto improvements are unreliable even for the purpose for which they were 
designed, namely, comparing small changes within a short time span. According to Boadway 
(1974, 926): "when comparing alternative projects or policies, the one with the largest net 
gain is not necessarily the ‘best’ one in the compensation sense." When CV's are calculated 
at constant prices (using either ex ante or ex post prices) they are partial equilibrium 
measures and, as Jones (2002, 1) observes:  
… they coincide with CV's measured in general equilibrium if there is a single 
market clearing price ratio along the contract curve, which is the case when consumers 
have identical and homothetic preferences. Once the relative price changes along the 
contract curve the two measures do not coincide, and as the "Boadway paradox" 
demonstrates, partial equilibrium CV's are misleading measures of potential welfare 
gains in these circumstances.  
 
This critique applies to any NWE-type welfare change. W(t) need not be economic 
output or per capita consumption; it can be any single-valued measure of welfare. The 
changing numeraire problem exists whether prices or some other measure of relative value is 
used. Prices are merely an indicator of preferences, and any other relative valuation indicator 
would change as tastes change with changing reference points (Brekke, 1997). The changing 
reference point problem is, of course, compounded when comparing individual preferences 
across generations.    9
The use of an intergenerational PPI approach is implicit in neoclassical models of 
sustainability (Hartwick, 1994; Solow, 1993; Stavins, Wagner and Wagner, 2002). Even so, 
some argue that weak sustainability insists on a strict Pareto criterion since it calls for future 
generations to be at least as well off as the current generation. According to Neumayer 
(1999) weak sustainability "denies the validity of potential Pareto improvements in an 
intergenerational context and demands actual compensation if future generations would 
suffer from an action that benefits current generations." But this is only true if each 
generation is characterized by a "representative agent", an “average person” or any similar 
formulation where the welfare of a group of people is represented by a single entity. This is a 
widely used way to get around the paradoxes arising from PPI comparisons. Neumayer’s 
analysis, for example, "...mainly looks at inter-generational as opposed to intra-generational 
distributional questions. That is, in effect, for most of the analysis I assume that either the 
intra-generational distribution is just or that it is otherwise taken care of" (Neumayer, 1999, 
12). This is exactly the critical assumption behind the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle.
4 
Weak sustainability employs the potential, not strict, Pareto principle because it looks only at 
one index number for each generation, thereby ignoring intragenerational distribution and 
product mix. Even the simple case of two commodities and two consumers presents 
intractable problems for the welfaristic approach. Chipman and Moore (1976, p. 398) write:  
If there is only one commodity, desired by all individuals, then tastes are identical. And 
if there is only one individual, tastes are trivially identical. We shall see that if the 
proposition 'an increase in GNP implies an improvement in potential welfare' is to be 
true in the general case of  m individuals and n commodities, and if equilibrium is 
determined by competition in the market in the absence of centrally planned direction, 
tastes must be identical....when observations are made on competitive equilibria in 
different hypothetical situations, in order for us to be able to conclude that an increase 
in GNP implies an improvement in potential welfare in all such conceivable situations, 
it is necessary for preferences to be identical and homothetic.   10
The essential picture of a modern economy, as pointed by Adam Smith well over two 
hundred years ago, is millions of individuals, groups, and firms each pursuing their own 
interests and somehow ending up with a more or less stable order. Paradoxically, NWE 
macroeconomic models, including models of sustainability, consider almost no activity 
which requires coordination or interdependence (van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003). NWE 
models of sustainability cannot do what is claimed for them unless tastes are identical and 
preferences are homothetic. Interpersonal comparisons of utility seem to be both necessary 
and desirable in judging alternative policies (Hammond, 1996; Harsanyi, 1987; Sen 1999). 
The Hartwick-Solow rule for weak sustainability is that an economy is sustainable if 
it maintains the capital stock necessary to sustain welfare. But moving the focus of 
sustainability from output to the capital required to produce it only compounds the theoretical 
difficulties. The Cambridge debate over capital highlighted several theoretical difficulties 
with the neoclassical production function and the role of capital in NWE (Harcourt, 1972). 
Robinson (1954) pointed out that the neoclassical (Clark-Knight) concept of capital cannot 
serve as an input in a production function since it must be measured in monetary units, and 
thus the value of the input “capital” cannot be separated from the value of the output it is 
producing. Like "utility", "capital" is heterogeneous and apparently intractable theoretical 
problems arise when its heterogeneity is recognized. The neoclassical solution, paralleling 
the use of the representative agent in utility theory, is to create a homogeneous kind of capital 
("leets" or “putty-clay”). As Asheim (1994, 257) has demonstrated, “with multiple capital 
goods, it is not in general possible to construct an exact indicator of sustainability on the 
basis of current price information.” The importance of the Cambridge controversies for the 
Hartwick-Solow rule is that the value of capital as a factor of production depends crucially   11
on income distribution. This is a problem for measures of natural capital as well as 
manufactured capital. 
  The weak sustainability solution to the intergenerational welfare problem, separating 
capital stock from the output it produces, does not work unless an assumption is made that 
either substitution among different kinds of capital is universal or that money is a substitute 
for anything. But the value of capital, natural or otherwise, cannot be defined independently 
of output. And it is not true that with a given stock of capital, anything at all can be produced. 
The aesthetic value of a rainforest cannot be re-produced if the rainforest no longer exists. 
How can we know what sorts of capital to maintain without knowing the details of what is to 
be produced? The “value” of sustainable capital depends on the “value” of sustainable 
consumption. If capital cannot be consistently defined even for strictly economic capital like 
machines, it is perhaps näive to assume that it can be defined in the case of "natural capital” 
consisting of essential but largely unknown ecosystem functions and relationships. 
  III. CONSUMPTION, HAPPINESS AND SUSTAINABLE WELFARE 
The new welfare economic analysis of sustainability begins by defining utility 
broadly but after that the maximand W(.) becomes, in one form or another, the output of a 
market economy (output, consumption, or per capita consumption). Ideally this output is 
produced by an economy in which all prices are corrected for market failure (Solow, 1993) 
but in practice reported economic output is used (Nordhaus, 2001). The most widely-used 
indicator of sustainable welfare is a non-declining per capita consumption of goods and 
services (Beckerman, 1994; Dasgupta, 2002; Nordhaus, 2001; Pearce and Atkinson, 1993).
5 
  Dasgupta (2002) offers an analysis of sustainability based on the Ramsey-Koopmans 
social welfare function:   13
by him “infers changes in welfare from the consumption behavior of households” (Slesnick, 
1998, 2108). Survey-based measures of well-being are excluded from Slesnick’s discussion 
because they are “subjective” and “fundamentally different from welfare estimates based on 
households’ revealed preferences” (Slesnick 1998, 2109). The still-prevailing view is that the 
revealed preference utility function depicts some sort of natural law unaffected by the 
vagaries of human psychology.
6 For one isolated individual the assumption that, ceteris 
paribus, dU/dY is positive seems reasonable. But a growing body of evidence shows that it is 
not generally positive in a real life social context, at least above some minimal income level 
(Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Ng (2001) has demonstrated that economic growth may reduce 
welfare even with individual and government optimization.  
  The focus of environmental criticisms of weak sustainability has been that human 
welfare is enhanced by non-market environmental amenities (Daily, 1997) and that natural 
capital is essential to the production process (Costanza et al.,1997). The neoclassical answer 
has been to insist that welfare should be defined as broadly as possible, and that capital 
should include everything that generates welfare. Weak sustainability advocates rely on the 
Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, that is, almost any Pareto efficient 
outcome can be achieved via competitive markets through enlightened government 
intervention. Once all externalities are identified and corrected a sustainable economy may 
be achieved. As Beckerman argues, weak sustainability "appears to be redundant and unable 
to qualify as a logical constraint on welfare maximization" (Beckerman, 1994, 203). 
  If it is not true, or only very weakly true, that dU/dY > 0 where does this leave the 
sustainability debate? If increased consumption does not lead to increased welfare, how do 
we re-define the welfare function W(t)? It seems clear that definitions of social welfare   14
necessarily involve interpersonal comparisons of utility, but most economists are reluctant to 
accept “subjective” measures of well-being. Psychologists have long argued that well-being 
derives from a wide variety of individual, social and genetic factors. Economists came to the 
issue later but significant contributions have been made by Easterlin (1974, 2001); Frank 
(1999); Frey (1997), Hirsh (1976), Ng (1997); Oswald (1997) and Scitovsky (1976). The 
increasingly high level of rigor of experimental psychology has helped to make the idea of 
measurable utility acceptable to economists (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004; Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002, 21). Methods have been devised and tested and calibrated to accurately 
measure levels of happiness across individuals and even across cultures. According to Ng 
(1999) and others we are now closer than anyone could have imagined to developing 
something like Bentham’s “hedonometer” providing a cardinal measure of utility. The 
existence of sound, scientific measures of well-being, together with an increasing array of 
social, environmental and economic indicators (Flynn, Berry, and Heintz, 2002) makes it 
possible to determine economic policies that will directly enhance social welfare. 
  What makes people happy? Surveys, behavioral experiments, and neurological 
analysis have identified key factors positively influencing well-being. These include health 
(especially self-reported health) (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag, 2002), close relationships 
and marriage, intelligence, education, and religion (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Age, gender and 
income also influence happiness, but not to the degree once thought. Some “stylized facts” 
about income and happiness have been established. First, people in wealthier countries are 
generally happier than people in poorer countries (Diener, Diener, and Diener, 1995). But 
even this correlation is weak and the happiness data shows many anomalies. For example, 
some surveys show that people in Nigeria are happier than people in Austria, France and   15
Japan (Frey and Stutzer, 2002, table 2.2, p. 35). Second, past a certain stage of development, 
increasing incomes do not lead to greater happiness. For example, real per capita income in 
the U.S. has increased sharply in recent decades but reported happiness has declined 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2000; Lane, 2000, Meyers, 2000). Similar results have been 
reported for Japan and Western Europe (Easterlin, 1995). Studies of individuals also show a 
lack of correlation between increases in income and increases in happiness (Brickman, 
Coates and Janoff-Bulman 1978; Frey and Stutzer 2002). Third, security seems to be a key 
element in happiness. Large welfare gains would come from a focus on improving welfare 
based on those things that increase individual security like health insurance, old age security, 
employment and job security. Fourth, mental health is a crucial factor in happiness. Frey and 
Stutzer (2002) and Layard (2003) argue, based on happiness survey results, for more public 
spending on mental health, especially for the very young since apparently the first few years 
of a person’s life play a large role in their future happiness. If we want future generations to 
experience a high and sustainable level of welfare, we are likely to get high rates of return by 
investing in policies to insure adequate child nutrition, health care, education, and family 
counseling. Fifth, richer social relationships generally make people happier. This implies that 
welfare gains may be obtained from increased leisure time, and more public spending on 
social and recreational infrastructure.  All of this research implies that the focus on GNP 
growth as a means to increase welfare may be misplaced. Ng (2003, 307) has demonstrated 
that analyzing preferences while ignoring the larger objective of welfare or happiness 
introduces a systematic materialistic bias: 
Such a bias, in combination with relative-income effects, environmental disruption 
effects, and over-estimation of the excess burden of taxation, results in over-spending 
on private consumption and under-provision of public goods, and may make economic 
growth welfare-reducing.   16
 
What are the implications of all this for environmental sustainability? There is some 
evidence that when individuals are more secure financially (not necessary wealthier) they are 
more likely to care about the well-being of future generations and the well-being of the 
environment. Rangel (2003) argues that social security is good for the environment. Several 
of the economic security increasing policies discussed above—providing  health care, job 
security, and a minimum income—may be classified as “backward generational goods” 
(BIGs). These goods play a crucial role in sustaining investment in “forward 
intergenerational goods” (FIGs) like environmental preservation. So it seems that focusing 
policies on subjective indicators of happiness, rather than on per capita income, would pay a 
double dividend. People would be happier and also more willing to support polices 
promoting environmental sustainability. Welsch (2002) uses reported well-being for 54 
countries to estimate a hedonic indicator of the trade-off between environmental quality and 
per capita income. Welsch’s study is path-breaking in that it takes self-reported happiness as 
an indicator of welfare, and treats per capita income as an explanatory variable. Welsch finds 
support for the hypothesis that specific forms of pollution are negatively related to well-
being. Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson, and Daruvala (2002) found that, not only are people 
averse to inequality, risk, and a decline in relative standing, the social marginal utility of 
income may turn negative even at non-extreme income levels. Regarding the environment 
there is considerable evidence that at least some people hold non-anthropocentric ethical 
views (Johansson-Stenman, 2002). 
  Focusing policy on well-being rather than per capita consumption might have 
important positive implications for sustainability. But even if sustainable welfare policies are   17
based on scientifically measured “preferences” this leaves us with the problem that it may not 
insure the preservation of the life support systems of the planet. Examples abound of 
societies that apparently worked well in satisfying the preferences of their citizens but ended 
in ecological collapse (Brander and Taylor, 1998). Humans get subjective well-being from 
nature but this does not insure that individuals living today will choose to preserve those 
features of nature that may be essential to future generations. Viewing the essential life 
support systems of the planet as mere inputs into a utility function, no matter how broadly 
defined, denies the basic biophysical nature of the human species. To fully develop a viable 
alternative to weak sustainability, scientific measures of the factors contributing to human 
well-being are needed but also needed are indicators of the physical and biological 
requirements for long-term human survival. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD CONSILIENCE  
  The first major difficulty with measures of weak sustainability is the theoretical 
impossibility of making welfare comparisons without resorting to interpersonal comparisons 
of utility (Chipman and Moore, 1978; Suzumura, 1999). In spite of this, the Kaldor-Hicks 
approach is followed by most current applications of economic theory to the sustainability 
problem. By this approach, it is assumed that as long as some index of total welfare is 
increased it is possible to make some people happier without making anyone else less happy. 
But contemporary microeconomic theory tells us that, even if all externalities, including 
intergenerational ones, are corrected the NWE still offers no theoretically consistent basis to 
evaluate changes in the well-being of different contemporary individuals, much less changes 
in the well-being of different generation.    18
  The second major difficulty with weak sustainability is the use of per capita 
consumption as a proxy for welfare. Findings from happiness surveys, and other evidence 
about well-being and environmental attitudes, suggest some very different sorts of policies 
than those based on sustaining per capita consumption. The argument that economists could 
concern themselves with efficiency and ignore distribution has proved to be theoretically 
unsupportable. This calls into question the preoccupation of economists with increasing net 
economic output in the view that this will, at least potentially, lead to greater social welfare.  
  Most important for the sustainability debate is the implication of contemporary 
welfare theory that more economic growth is not the key to sustain well-being or 
environmental integrity. But how much economic growth do we need to provide money for 
the material things that contribute to making people happy? Can we “develop” without 
growing? Can one country stop growing or would this amount to unilateral disarmament, 
leaving that country behind in the technology, capital investment and entrepreneurial 
dynamism necessary to successfully compete in a capitalist economy. What policy changes 
would the transition to a happiness economy require? Finally, and perhaps the most serious 
issue, how is human welfare related to sustaining the life support systems of the planet? How 
directly can welfare, however broadly defined, be related to preserving ecosystems and non-
human life forms necessary for long-run human survival?  
  The failure of NWE has spurred the search for a more scientifically valid foundation 
for economic theory and policy. In fields as varied as development economics, game theory, 
and finance new models are being developed based on actual human behavior in its 
institutional and environmental contexts. A common theme in these new models is 
“consilience”, that is, “the linking of facts and fact-based theories across disciplines to create   19
a common groundwork for explanation” (Wilson, 1998, 8). Integrating economics with 
anthropology, biology, and psychology can lead not only to better economic policies for 
immediate human welfare, it can also lead to a better understanding of how humans fit in 
with the rest of the natural world. Such an understanding is essential if Homo sapiens’ 
presence on the planet is to be something more than a fiery but short-lived phenomenon.    20
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ENDNOTES  
 
1. Sustainable consumption and intertemporal resource allocation has been extensively 
discussed. Dasgupta and Heal (1979) proved that a sustainable consumption path exists if a 
rising marginal product for the resource compensates for resource depletion. They also show 
that any positive discount rate implies declining consumption levels. Hartwick (1977) 
demonstrated that a constant per capita consumption path is possible if all scarcity rent is 
invested in capital. Howarth and Norgaard (1990) showed that efficient allocation of 
resources across generations does not necessarily result in sustainable consumption. Pezzey 
(1989) points out that the definition of sustainability as non-declining welfare over time is 
different than maximizing net present value. For further discussion see Pezzey and Toman 
(2002) and Tietenberg (2003, chapter 23). 
 
2. Also central to this analysis is Weitzman’s (1976) result that Net National Product (NNP) 
is equal to the present value of consumption. Following the usual economic convention of 
equating consumption and welfare, it is an easy step to the result that a set of prices exist so 
that maximizing wealth is equivalent to maximizing welfare (see the discussion in Brekke 
1994). The Second Fundamental Theorem can then be invoked to take care of everything 
from externalities to existence values. 
 
3. Each point on a production possibilities frontier will have a different contract curve in 
consumption space associated with it. The envelope of these, transferred to utility space, is a 
grand utilities possibilities frontier (GUPF). The Kaldor-Hicks criterion can only be applied 
if there are efficiency gains to be captured by moving from a non-optimal (meaning not 
maximally efficient) situation to (or toward) a Pareto efficient situation. So the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion must compare situations where at least one of them is off the GUPF. Comparing two 
points on the GUPF would necessarily involve interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
 
4. That weak sustainability uses the PPI principle is recognized by Stavins, Wagner and 
Wagner (2002). In order to judge whether a policy change will move the economy toward 
sustainability: [Instead of the strict Pareto criterion] “Economists resort instead to seeking 
`potential' Pareto improvements in the Kaldor-Hicks sense--the world is viewed as being 
made better off if the magnitude of the gains and the magnitude of losses are such that the 
gainers can fully compensate the losers for their loses and still be better off themselves. Note 
again that under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the change is considered to be an improvement 
whether or not the compensation actually takes place. Actual compensation of losers by 
winners is essentially left to the political process.” 
 
5. Although Dasgupta and Solow define utility broadly it is clear that they mean only to 
insure that the Second Fundamental Theorem is invoked to correct all market failures. Utility 
still derives from consumption. 
 
6. Varian (1992, 93) writes: “A utility function is often a very convenient way to describe 
preferences, but it should not be given any psychological interpretation.” He then goes on to 
characterize the utility function as exhibiting monotonicity, local non-satiation, convexity 
and so on. These are psychological assumptions about human behavior. 